Delivery of Flying Boat to Singapore.


Background.

Flying boat was to be delivered to 205 squadron based at Singapore.

Prior to their departure from Plymouth, following engine problems, it became apparent that the assigned fitters didn’t have enough experience on the Kestrel engine and none on flying boats.

Another problem was the lack of experience by the wireless operator, having been transferred from a fighter squadron. Following a round Britain flight operating the W/T set, he was judged able to carry out his duties on the Singapore flight.

The Flight

Originally, the flight was scheduled to depart RAF Mount Batten, Plymouth for 22.07.35, but adverse weather forced a 24-hour delay until the 23rd.

Their first stop was Portugal. H.Q. Coastal Area had given instructions that, unless that country was reached within 7.5 hours flying time, then a landing at Lisbon had to be made. Aided by a tail wind as they approached Portugal, which resulted in an increased ground speed and a reduced petrol consumption, it was calculated that the crew could reach Gibraltar, but by now, they had been airborne for 8 hours and 15 minutes. Attempts to convey the crew’s plans to continue failed as the W/T operator was unable to establish contact, and so the original instructions had to be complied with. After re-fuelling the crew took off again for Gibraltar. Communications were described as poor, chiefly attributed to the inexperience of the operator.

Weather again played havoc with the crew’s departure on the 24th and the 25th. A favourable weather report later in the morning, but the flying boat wouldn’t have reached Malta before darkness set in.

Better conditions were forecast for the 26th, Malta being reached after 10 hours 30 minutes of flying time. Communications were described as showing improvement. Malta’s D/F was only picked up after the island was in sight.

At Kalafrana.

On arriving at Kalafrana, the captain complained about the very poor communication results obtained on the Plymouth-Gibraltar and Gibraltar-Malta flights. He suggested that the operator be replaced by a more experienced one for the rest of the flight, and with the A.O.C. Malta’s approval, the operator was replaced by a more experienced one from 202 Flying boat squadron.

In Malta, maintenance work was carried out, fixing the auto-pilot and replacing inlet valves spring of the front starboard engine. (The Singapore III had four engine, but set in tandem, in a push-pull configuration.) The radio set was thoroughly tested by W/T personnel, and judged to be working perfectly.

Investigations into the communications poor performance resulted in the following.

The main battery of the driving the 80 watt motor generator wasn’t fully charged when the crew left Gibraltar, and remained in this partially discharged state throughout the flight.

The W/T operator stated that he had starting charging the battery for the Boats’ A.P.U., but after 90 minutes was ordered to stop by the captain, and send the battery to H.M.S. Resolution for proper charging. Although they were informed that it would require between 8 – 10 hours to fully charge, the battery was returned to the flying boat after two hours. It was then further discharged when it was used to supply power for internal lightning, mooring lights and Aldis lamp.

This may explain why signals were weak. Furthermore, when attempts were made to contact Malta, the operator had not been made aware that Malta’s D/F frequencies had been changed to 168 K/Cs. Even after Hal-Far, through naval channels, signalled the correct frequencies to the flying boat when in Gibraltar (delivered by hand), the operator claimed he had not been informed of the changes. This explains why he was so late in establishing radio contact with Malta./br>
There wasn’t adequate time to properly examine the testimony of the operator due to the strict time-table of the crew’s schedule. Because he was unable to fully charge the battery, and hadn’t been properly informed of the frequency changes, it was though he wasn’t entirely to blame for the poor communications performance.

Departure from Malta was on the 28th, destination Aboukir, Egypt, which was reached after 8.5 hours flying time. Communications were also described as showing a greater improvement the D/F on 168KCs being received up to 400 miles from Malta. A change to 6500KCs saw the D/F being received for another 200 miles.

This was the only time during the entire journey that HF communications were successful, contact being made with both Malta and Aboukir. Despite consistent attempts, no further contacts on HF were made with any other RAF W/T stations.

Demonstration

During the monsoon period of 1934, flying boats of No.205 squadron conducted a flight across India. The squadron’s report was that this was so hazardous as to make it impracticable.

Following the discovery of a new route, which eliminated some of the disadvantages of the route used by 203 squadron, it was decided to use the delivery of a Singapore III flying boat to Singapore to try the new route. The pilot was instructed to include not only his opinion of the practicability of the new trans-India route, but the chosen route had to be one where the flying boat landed in British colonies or spheres of British influence.

Special reference was to be paid to the following-

Can the route be used without undue risks by a squadron using standard equipment and trained up to the average RAF standard?

What delay is likely to be imposed by weather conditions in avoiding undue risks?
The part of the delivery flight that was a demonstration of flying trans-India is outside the scope of this website. It took place between 04.08.35, when the crew departed Ras-al-Khaimah, UAE for Karachi, and ended on the 11th, when they departed Chittagong.

The flying boat eventually reached Singapore on 30.08.35.